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Kane Mary Kay
Essay
Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role
of the Class Action Lawyer
Mary Kay Kane*
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either
to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.'
I. Introduction
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal
Rules) in 1938,2 federal courts have encouraged the liberal joinder of
claims and parties so that one complete adjudication results.3 The 1966
amendments to the Federal Rules, which changed all the joinder rules,
strengthened this judicial philosophy. To encourage broad and flexible
joinder, the amendments substituted pragmatic tests for formulaic ones,
and rested joinder of claims and parties on a transaction standard.4 The
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B. 1968, J.D.
1971, University of Michigan.
I gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions made by Professor Richard Marcus on an
earlier draft of this Essay. Of course, all opinions and errors remain my responsibility.
1. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 86(a).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13-14, 18-25. The original Federal Rules' approach to joinder differed
substantially from that approach taken by code pleading and common-law pleading systems. For
example, under state common-law pleading rules, causes of action could not be joined if they were of
a different nature and the same judgment could not be rendered. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, HAND-
BOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING § 25 (1969). Misjoinder would have occurred if the parties
were not the same in all joined actions. See Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REV. 571,
582-83 (1920). See generally C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING §§ 56-77
(2d ed. 1947) (discussing pre-Federal Rules state code joinder provisions); J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY,
supra, § 25 (discussing limited joinder opportunities under common-law pleading rules). The draft-
ers of the Federal Rules firmly embraced joinder as the most effective means of achieving judicial
economy. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.6 (1985).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), 20 (governing compulsory counterclaims and permissive party
joinder). In particular, rule 19, governing compulsory joinder of parties, was completely rewritten to
reflect pragmatic considerations rather than abstract labels. FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory commit-
tee's note (1966 amend.); see Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
117 n. 12 (1968) ("Where the new version emphasizes the pragmatic consideration of the effects of
the alternatives of proceeding or dismissing, the older version tended to emphasize the classification
of parties .... "). Similarly, the revisers completely rewrote rule 23, governing class actions, to
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message was clear: increase Judicial economy and efficiency by making it
easier to join all related malters and parties in one lawsuit.5
Interestingly, as the contours of litigation have expanded, little if
any attention has been paid to the lawyer's role in these larger lawsuits.
It is as if all those concerned simply assumed either that the lawyer's role
would not change significantly or, if it did, attorneys could adapt easily.
The rule amendments focused on the courts and the standards under
which judges could allow larger suits, as well as the means by which they
should manage this new, more complex form of litigation.6 This lack of
attention to the lawyer's role was shortsighted, as events in the last fif-
teen years have made clear.
Litigation in the federal courts has grown exponentially since the
early 1970s. 7 Although complex litigation, such as class actions, is only a
small percentage of the suits filed," each one necessarily consumes sub-
stantial judicial resources. 9 Thus, not surprisingly, an increasing number
of critics have suggested that these lawsuits are too numerous and com-
substitute functional tests for conceptual ones. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note
(1966 amend.). See generally 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1753 (1986) (analyzing the 1966 amendments to rule 23).
5. The Supreme Court's expansion of pendent jurisdiction also has encouraged broad joinder
of claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The growing use of a
transaction standard for determining whether a claim is precluded also has increased the pressure for
broad joinder. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1980).
6. For example, the 1966 revision of rule 23 included not only a complete revision of class
certification standards, but also entirely new provisions. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 383 U.S. 1047
(1966 amend.) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 308 U.S. 689 (1938). The new subdivisions address the
procedural aspects of class actions, including orders that might be issued to conduct the action more
efficiently. See 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1753. Furthermore, in
1969 the United States Judicial Conferece published the first Manual for Complex and Multidistrict
Litigation, containing detailed procedures and suggestions for courts confronted with these lawsuits.
The manual has been revised several times as more was learned about case management techniques,
and a completely new second manual was issued in 1985. See MANUAL (SECOND) FOR COMPLEX
LrrIGATION (1985).
7. Annual statistics reveal the size of this litigation explosion. For example, in June 1964
federal courts had only 72,195 civil cases on file. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1964, at 214 (1965) (table Cl). By June 1974,
however, that figure had risen to 107,230, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1974, at 383 (1975) (table Cl), and in June 1984 it was
250,292, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1984, at 249 (1985) (table C!) [hereinafter 1984 ANNUAL REPORT].
8. Federal class action filings reaiched their peak in 1976 when federal courts had 3584 class
actions on file and an additional 5987 pending. But even at that peak, class actions composed only
2.7% of all civil suits filed, and class actions represented only 4.3% of all civil suits pending in the
federal courts. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 160 (table 34). More recent figures show an
even smaller percentage. In 1983, only 1023 class suits were filed, totaling .4% of all civil actions
filed, and the 2609 class suits pending equaled only 1.1% of all pending civil suits. Id. In 1984 the
figures declined even further, only 988 class actions were filed, and class actions accounted for only
.9% of all pending civil actions. Id.
9. The substantial investment of judicial resources is required as a consequence of the special
procedural issues posed by class actions that are not present in traditional two-party suits, such as
making sure all members of the class are adequately represented. See infra Part III.
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plex for the courts to handle.10 They have leveled this criticism most
vociferously against class actions. Some courts and commentators specif-
ically have criticized class action attorneys, accusing them of filing frivo-
lous and ill-prepared suits solely to obtain large attorneys' fees. 1 Despite
the class action's great potential for expanding access to courts for some
whose rights otherwise might not have been adjudicated, observers in the
1970s perceived that the costs of class actions were too high,12 and judges
retreated from their early enthusiasm about this procedural device.' 3
Courts and commentators in the 1980s have responded more con-
structively;' 4 instead of restricting class suits, courts have attempted to
control them more effectively.' 5 Although the federal courts have not
yet developed uniform practices for handling these cases,1 6 commenta-
10. E.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274-77 (1982); Kirkham, Com-
plex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 200 (1976).
11. See, eg., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975); Piambino
v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1143-46 (11th Cir. 1985); Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674,
680 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits--The Twenty-Third AnnualAntitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1971); Simon, Class
Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 390 (1972). Courts recognized early
that fee petitions had to be scrutinized carefully to prevent class actions from being simply strike
suits filed for large attorneys' fees. E.g., Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, 55 F.R.D. 221, 224
(N.D. Ill. 1972); In re Westee Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1296, 1302-04 (S.D. Tex. 1970); see also Coffee,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforce-
ment of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 701-19 (1986) (analyz-
ing the legal and economic incentives that encourage the rational plaintiff's attorney to bring actions
which have little probability of success at trial).
12. E.g., 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1754, at 52-54; Handler,
supra note 11, at 5-12.
13. See, ag., La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1973)
(restricting rule 23 in order to "avoid the intractable problems of massive class actions"); Mudd v.
Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1975) ("As the size and scope of plaintiff class versus
defendant class lawsuits expend, [sic] there increasingly must be concern that the federal courts may
become employed in ways inappropriate to the nature of the judicial process.").
14. The Supreme Court has recognized that the "remedy for [class action] abuses does not lie in
denying the relief sought here, but with re-examination of Rule 23 as to untoward consequences."
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); see also Coleman v. Block, 580 F.
Supp. 194, 208-09 (D.N.D. 1984) (upholding class definition on grounds that division into subclasses
would undermine judicial economy and efficiency).
15. See Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 331-36 (1983).
Judge Williams discusses his ultimately unsuccessful attempt to certify a nationwide class of Dalkon
Shield users. He also describes the unsuccessful efforts of two other federal judges to use class
actions creatively in the Kansas City Skywalk and Dalkon Shield litigation. See also Miller, Of
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92
HARV. L. REv. 664, 680-81 (1979) (discussing the potential for better administration of class actions
due to the courts' increased use of rule 23, and the increased willingness of judges to oversee and
control discovery, settlement proposals, and fee petitions). But see Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344,
1355-57 (1st Cir. 1985) (refusing to certify class because class members could obtain similar relief by
private injunctive or declaratory action).
16. When judicial resources become strained, federal courts commonly give special masters
responsibility over discovery matters in large complex lawsuits. W. BRAZIL, G. HAZARD & P. RICE,
MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 5
(1983). For a description of other ways in which special masters have been used, as well as some of
387
HeinOnline -- 66 Tex. L. Rev.  387 1987-1988
Texas Law Review Vol. 66:385, 1987
tors have suggested several procedural reforms to improve the existing
system. One recommendation is to draft contextual procedural rules
rather than using one set of general rules to govern litigation that varies
so dramatically in size and complexity. 17 Others have suggested new ju-
dicial management techniques to handle complex and class litigation. 18
Commentators also have proposed amendments to rule 23 to address spe-
cific problems. 19 Finally, trial judges have been devising ad hoe solutions
to the problems created by the cases on their own dockets. 20
All these approaches should be applauded, yet they suffer from one
defect: they fail to address the problems of modern class actions from
the perspective of the class action lawyer. 21 Although reformers cer-
tainly must gauge the effects of their proposals on courts, a look at the
lawyer's role is equally important. Class actions cannot become effective
procedural devices until class action lawyers appreciate why it is in their
interest to change and until appropriate incentives are adopted to en-
courage change.22 Examining the lawyer's role and its peculiar tensions
may better inform courts about how they can encourage the most effi-
cient and productive litigation practices and discourage the most ineffi-
the dangers, see Brazil, Special Mastets in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping
Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 394, 395-98 (1986).
17. See Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 546
(1986); Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REv. 243, 244 (1984).
18. See, eg., W. BRAZIL, G. HAZARD & P. RICE, supra note 16; MANUAL (SECOND) FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (1985); W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX
LITIGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAvfYERS AND JUDGES (1982).
19. E.g., Section of Litig., Am. Bar Ass'n, Report and Recommendations of the Special Commit-
tee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 200-03, 210 (1986); Berry, Ending Substance's
Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 299, 322-44 (1980); Mickum & Rhees, Federal Class Action Reform: A Response to
the Proposed Legislation, 69 Ky. L.J. 799, 802-08 (1981).
20. These solutions range from the very creative and well-documented experience of Judge
Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation, see Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases:
The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CilI. L. REV. 337, 341-43 (1986), to more modest attempts to
protect against attorney self-interest that might conflict with class members' interests, see infra text
accompanying notes 84-97. See also Williams, supra note 15, at 331-34 (describing efforts to use
class actions creatively in three cases that eventually were overturned by appellate courts).
21. Although the lawyer's role and obligations in class litigation have not been addressed care-
fully or systematically, the 1983 amencments to rule 11 (prefiling inquiries into pleadings and other
papers) and to rule 26 (discovery) are attempts to address more generally perceived failings of law-
yers in litigation. See FED. R. Civ. 'P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983 amend.) ("The new
language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the
affirmative duty imposed by the rule .... This standard is more stringent than the original ....");
FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1983 amend.) (noting that the amendments were
supposed to correct discovery abuses).
22. Professor Coffee has argued most persuasively about the need to focus on incentives for
plaintiffs' attorneys when considering class action reforms and has contributed several provocative
ideas for possible changes. Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND.
L.J. 625 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Rethinking]; Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litiga-
tion: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 896-9 17
(1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulation].
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cient and unproductive ones-basically, the ways in which courts can use
both the carrot and the stick to implement necessary reforms. 23
Two features of class actions that most distinguish them from two-
party suits are the degree of management required and the problems of
client control and conflicts of interest. These two general, yet unique,
characteristics of class litigation explain some of the peculiar pressures
placed upon the modern class action lawyer and provide the most fruitful
model for inquiry.24
Class litigation requires a degree of organization and tight manage-
ment by lawyers that seldom is necessary in an ordinary two-party law-
suit. Class actions commonly involve many lawyers, making
coordination and cooperation extremely important, both to foster litiga-
tion economies and to control attorneys' fees.25 In addition, class action
parties exercise little, if any, control over their lawyers. This lack of con-
trol results in part because the usual employer-employee relationship is
absent from this form of litigation and in part because class action law-
yers also are charged with representing the interests of an amorphous
group of clients. As a consequence, those attorneys make many decisions
that are normally reserved for the client-substantive decisions that are
likely to affect the outcome of the litigation.26 In this climate, the poten-
tial for conflicts of interest to go unnoticed is enormous. The responses
of attorneys and courts to these two features of class actions reflect both
the problems of and the challenge for the modern class action litigator.
Their responses also suggest some incentives that might be used to en-
courage further improvements.
23. Similar concerns about the lawyer's role appear in shareholder derivative actions. Professor
Coffee has contributed some interesting evaluations of lawyers in this arena, exploring their eco-
nomic motivations and how the law might better control abuses by creating incentives reflecting
those motivations. See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 33-48.
24. A detailed analysis of the differences between litigating class actions and two-party suits is
beyond the scope of this Essay. That task would entail inquiring into the host of procedural issues
concerning the propriety of class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See generally 7A & 7B C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, §§ 1759-1763 (stating the prerequisites for a class
action). It would also entail looking at each stage of the litigation process and determining how the
complexity or character of a class action alters a lawyer's ordinary behavior. For example, how
should the lawyer prepare a jury trial in a class suit? See, e.g., Singleton & Kass, Helping the Jury
Understand Complex Cases, LITIGATION, Spring 1986, at 11.
25. Although this Essay focuses on class actions, cooperation among counsel in other mul-
tiparty cases also may be beneficial. See McSweeney & Brody, Defending the Multi-Party Civil Con-
spiracy Case, LITIGATION, Spring 1986, at 8.
26. Indeed, the unnamed class members most often have no effective control over their lawyers
at all. See infra text accompanying notes 53-57.
389
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II. Managing Class Actions
Lawyers have been slow to recognize the need to be more economi-
cal and coordinated in their preparation for class action litigation.27 In
fact, lawyers for some time bad little incentive to improve their manage-
ment techniques, perhaps revealing some disturbing features about the
bar as a whole.
Early judicial attempts to provide for efficiency often consisted of
appointing lead counsel or management committees.28  The attorneys'
fees decision in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, however, shows that
these devices alone are insufficient to encourage lawyers to develop eco-
nomical and efficient litigation practices. 29 In a 169-page opinion, Judge
McGylnn details a horror story of lawyer mismanagement and nonman-
agement. 30 After seven years, the parties settled the case, a series of
thirty-eight consolidated cases against multiple defendants charged with
conspiracy to fix the prices of fine paper. The court then was confronted
with fee petitions on behalf of forty-one private law firms and state attor-
neys general for a total of twenty-one million dollars, approximately
forty percent of the class recovery.31 In discussing why the attorneys'
fees applications were so excessive, Judge McGylnn describes how the
lawyers had established an organizational structure of committees and
subcommittees to handle each task in the case, and how that very struc-
ture caused mismanagement. 32 "It was inevitable that this type of struc-
ture would generate wasted hours on useless tasks, propagate duplication
and mask outright padding." 33 One of the worst examples was a charge
of approximately fifteen hundred hours by nine law firms for preparing
and taking the deposition of one third-party witness.34
Cases like Fine Paper finally provoked the judiciary to force lawyers
to become more efficient. 35 The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
27. Actually, lawyers have reacted slowly to pressure to keep litigation more affordable in civil
actions generally, and the courts have begun to force such behavior. See Kane, The Lawyer as
Litigator in the 1980s, 14 N. Ky. L. REv. 311 (1987).
28. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 549 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1977) (management commit-
tee); Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 51 F.R.D. 263, 264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (lead counsel), aff'd
sub noma. Farber v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 442 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1971).
29. 98 F.R.D. 48, 70-78 (E.D. Pa. 1983). On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded
some of the specific fee rulings, but affirmed most of the district court's opinion. See In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1984).
30. See, e.g., 98 F.R.D. at 75-76 (describing abuse and waste during trial preparation); id. at
215 (describing the failure of managing lawyer to organize and oversee trial preparation properly).
31. Id. at 68.
32. Id. at 70-76.
33. Id. at 75.
34. Id.
35. Contrasting the second Manual for Complex Litigation with the first demonstrates the re-
cent judicial recognition that class action management and organization cannot be left to the attor-
390
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provide judicial authority and guidance for pretrial management on an
expansive scale.36 By exercising tight control early in the litigation,
courts may be able to compel class action lawyers to stay abreast of these
cases, keep fees down, and most importantly, to keep the cases moving
along.37 Arguably, tight judicial management should force attorneys to
become better case managers. Although some have suggested that these
changes will not alter attorney conduct because the procedural rules now
discuss appropriate attorney behavior,38 class action attorneys should be-
gin to think about the roles they should play.
One of the most effective means courts have to force lawyers to be-
come better managers is their control over fees. In successful class ac-
tions, courts typically award attorneys' fees from any fund that is
obtained,3 9 unlike most other forms of litigation in which each side bears
its own expenses.4° Although the adoption of many statutes authorizing
the court to order the losing party to pay the winning party's fees has
narrowed this difference, 41 attorney fee awards still may be the major
incentive for lawyers to litigate class actions.42 Courts calculate attorney
neys alone. In the first, the Manual suggests that trial courts should not select lead counsel; instead,
this task should be left to plaintiffs' attorneys. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.92 (5th
ed. 1982). The second, however, instructs the judge to select lead counsel. MANUAL (SECOND) FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.224 (1985). That manual further instructs the judge to "make an in-
dependent assessment of the functions, identities, and organization of designated counsel, consider-
ing but not necessarily adopting the views of counsel." Id. at 20.
36. The revisers rewrote rule 16 to provide a judicial management process to address the
problems encountered in the entire pretrial phase. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note
(1983 amend).
37. The 1983 advisory committee's note to amended rule 16 recognized that empirical studies
have demonstrated that early judicial control results in cases being disposed of with less cost and
delay. See id.
38. Arguably, the use of sanctions provided in the newly amended rules will not produce
change, but instead may make matters worse "by imposing an additional layer of procedural re-
sources that can be used by lawyers for tactical purposes." Elliott, Managerial Judging and the
Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306, 320 (1986).
39. The traditional premise for awarding attorneys' fees in class suits is the common fund ra-
tionale. Because the plaintiff's efforts produce a recovery benefiting all class members, equitable
notions demand that all members share in the costs (fees) necessary to obtain that result. See Boeing
Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 479 (1980); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 531-33 (1881).
Thus, fees are paid out of the recovery; they are not shifted to the opponent. See 7B C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1803, at 502.
40. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 275 (1975); see also 10 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2675, at 302 (1983)
(noting that Alyeska Pipeline significantly curtailed the courts' power to award attorneys' fees based
on equitable considerations).
41. Most particularly, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)), which created many oppor-
tunities for fee awards against losing parties. Various other substantive statutes, such as the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 1987), and the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982), also authorize
attorneys' fees.
42. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 328 (1980). The amount of fees
awarded may reflect the benefit conferred by the action. Cf Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478 (attorneys' fees
391
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fee awards by using a common formula: the hours expended are multi-
plied by the relevant rate, the "lodestar. '43 The use of this formula with-
out other restrictions gave class action attorneys little incentive to avoid
duplicating each other's work. But times are changing. To force litigat-
ing attorneys to learn the lessons of ill-managed litigation, courts are en-
couraging more economical management through their control of
attorney fee awards.44 Couits now often carefully assess attorney fee pe-
titions and disallow fees for work that is duplicative or unproductive.45
More creatively, courts may set forth early guidelines or limits on
the fees to be awarded later so that counsel will have an incentive to act
more efficiently. 46 In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation47 illus-
trates this suggestion. Judge Grady, recognizing that the action already
had "more lawyers on the plaintiffs' side of the case than [he] or anyone
else could possibly keep track of,"4 8 issued guidelines for evaluating any
fees and expenses requiring court approval. The guidelines listed individ-
ual responsibilities (e.g., allowing compensation for only one attorney at-
tending depositions and court appearances); stated rates of
compensation; and disallowed fees for general legal research on well-
may be assessed against the fund recovered on behalf of the class, even though each absent class
member ultimately might not claim a portion of the fund, because all class members benefited by its
creation). Consequently, a successful action on behalf of a class of 100, for example, will result in a
larger fee than an action on behalf of a single client; this alone may encourage attorneys to file class
suits rather than individual actions. As one commentator noted, "Groups of people rarely form a
class and then find a lawyer. Rather, lawyers deal with individuals who have their own personal
problems in mind and not those of a whole group." Lutz, Thinking About Class Actions, LITIGA-
TION, Spring 1985, at 23, 23.
43. The Third Circuit initiated the lodestar approach. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-69 (3d Cir. 1973). Most courts, including
the Supreme Court, have adopted it ir. allowing fees under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1984).
44. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force (Oct. 8, 1985),
reprinted in 108 F.R.D. 237, 262-63 ('985) [hereinafter Court Awarded Attorney Fees].
45. E.g., King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977), cert denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978); Metro Data Sys. v. Durango Sys., 597 F. Supp. 244, 246-47 (D. Ariz. 1984). Compare Dekro
v. Stern Bros. & Co., 571 F. Supp. 97, 106 (W.D. Mo. 1983) ("[Class counsel prosecuted the case in
an economical and efficient manner.... The cost-cutting measures utilized by class counsel merit an
award in addition to the lodestar since the very effect of these measures was to reduce the lodestar.")
with In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 600-01 (3d Cit. 1984) (upholding the district
court's application of a negative quality multiplier to lead counsel's fee petition for failure to manage
the case efficiently).
46. One suggestion is that early irt derivative litigation the court should set a percentage of the
recovery as a ceiling on the amount of fees that can be recovered under the lodestar formula. PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.18, at 253 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. A Third Circuit task force recom-
mended that in traditional common fund situations and statutory-fee cases that are likely to result in
a settlement fund (both typically class suits), the court should establish a percentage fee arrangement
early in the litigation reflecting a sliding scale dependent on the ultimate recovery. Court Awarded
Attorney Fees, supra note 44, at 262.
47. 572 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
48. Id. at 932.
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known legal issues, multiple document review, and communications be-
tween lead counsel and other class attorneys.49 Judge Grady also issued
guidelines for determining reasonable expenses and keeping time records
to allow easier review of the requested fees.50 The case is important not
because of the precise guidelines established, but because the court pro-
vided early incentives for the lawyers to manage the suit economically.51
The message was clear: lawyers have the responsibility to develop more
efficient means of coordinating and managing complex class actions, and
the failure to do so will not be at the expense of the class or the opposing
party.
Through the imposition of such judicial constraints, the class action
attorney is required to become more skilled in management. He is forced
to think of litigation strategy and cost-effective planning. This move-
ment has been gradual and really does not change the litigator's role, but
only adds another dimension to it. The success of this change will be
difficult to assess, perhaps measured only by the decrease in judicial or-
ders reprimanding lawyers who have not learned the lessons of the 1970s.
The need for this added responsibility is clear: not only must courts
learn how to manage complex class actions, but also attorneys must
share this responsibility. The unique lawyer management aspect of class
actions is one area in which courts have identified that the heart of the
problem, as well as its solution, lies in the hands of attorneys litigating
these suits. Courts have focused on what incentives or disincentives will
alter lawyers' conduct to produce greater efficiency. Careful oversight of
attorney fee awards by the courts creates that incentive.5 2
III. Client Control and Conflicts of Interest
A second characteristic of class actions that requires special atten-
tion is that class attorneys, more than any other litigators, bear most of
the responsibility for the conduct of the litigation. As the Third Circuit
observed: "In a massive class action.., it is counsel for the class who
has the laboring oar. The class representatives furnish the factual basis
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and provide the outline of the con-
49. Id. at 933-34.
50. Id. at 934.
51. Attorneys reacted favorably to Judge Grady's order, recognizing the great potential for cost
savings with these types of controls, if applied flexibly. T. WILLGING, JUDICIAL REGULATION OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES: BEGINNING THE PROCESS AT PRETRIAL 11-14 (1984).
52. Tight fee control in class suits under rule 23(b)(3) may create a counter-productive pressure
to opt-out for attorneys whose clients have a sufficiently large stake to offer the potential of a large
contingent fee. See Coffee, Rethinking, supra note 22, at 646-47. Nonetheless, this pressure does not
negate the value of court control. It merely suggests the need to find additional incentives or tech-
niques to avoid that result.
393
HeinOnline -- 66 Tex. L. Rev.  393 1987-1988
Texas Law Review Vol. 66:385, 1987
troversy, but the lawyers shape the claims for adjudication .... -53 This
control stems in part from the complexity of the litigation, which is diffi-
cult if not impossible to explain to the layperson.5 4 Additionally, the
lawyer exercises unparalleled control because not all potential class bene-
ficiaries are present or watching; thus, it is not necessary or realistic in
class suits to obtain authorization to make many decisions, which in or-
dinary two-party litigation axe made only after client consultation.55
Although the named representatives (who are self-appointed) 56 may
be consulted, their decisions may not be the same as those that would be
made by the absent class members. As a result, the lawyer in the modem
class action plays a more dominant role than the traditional adversarial
model envisions, and the importance of this role is magnified because the
absent class members may be bound by any judgment in the action.57
Yet class counsel's obligation to represent all class members necessarily
53. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.. 777 F.2d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 1985); accord Pettway v. Ameri-
can Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979);
Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973). Professor Coffee describes
the class action attorney not as an agent, "but more as an entrepreneur who regards a litigation as a
risky asset that requires continuing inestment decisions." Coffee, supra note 11, at 684.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this fact in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). The
Court ruled that a class representative whose personal claim had become moot could continue to
prosecute the action so long as adequate representation could be assured. The Court found adequate
representation because a conflict between the interests advanced in the litigation and those of the
unnamed class members was deemed %nlikely, and because "the interests of that class have been
competently urged at each level of the proceeding." Id. at 403. As Justice White noted in his
dissent:
In reality, there is no longer a named plaintiff in the case, no member of the class before the
Court. The unresolved issue, the attorney, and a class of unnamed litigants remain. None
of the anonymous members of the class is present to direct counsel and ensure that class
interests are being properly served.
Id. at 412 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Powell reached a similar conclusion. See Deposit Guar.
Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 353 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
54. Consider one district judge's description of the difficulties confronting court and counsel
during one settlement conference. " 'Angry and offended at what seemed to them small counterof-
fers, and fortified with a case of beer, the plaintiffs were ill disposed to listen to any explanation of
the deficiencies of the statistical case against Bell. Posturing and wild talk took the place of reasoned
analysis.'" Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1208 n.3 (5th Cir. Unit A) (quoting the opinion of
Mahon, J., N.D. Tex.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
55. See MODEL CODE OF PROFES;IONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 to -9 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1984).
56. Named representatives are self-appointed in the sense that they nominate themselves as the
representatives of the entire class, instead of being chosen by the class. Although the class represent-
atives may be "self-appointed," it is well recognized that they are "attorney-selected." See Coffee,
supra note 11, at 677-79, 682-83.
57. See, eg., Susman v. Lincoln A.m. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
942 (1977). The question whether the absentees were provided adequate representation becomes
critical because of the potential binding effect of any judgment. A total failure of adequate represen-
tation may result in a successful attack on the judgment on due process grounds. E.g., Gonzales v.
Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 73-76 (5th Cir. 1973). But this outcome is deplorable because the underlying
goal of judicial economy in the class suit is lost.
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results in numerous potential conflicts of interest between the lawyers,
the named class representatives, and the unnamed class members.
A. Identifying Conflicts of Interest
Commentators have identified several points of potential conflict,5 8
but most focus on settlement negotiations.5 9 Consider three different set-
tlement scenarios. In the first, a settlement proposal includes an amount
for the class and for attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees may be awarded
either on the common fund rationale, in which the court exercises its
equitable power to spread the cost of obtaining the fund across class ben-
eficiaries, 60 or in fee-shifting cases, as a product of the simultaneous set-
tlement negotiation of fees with the merits. 61 In a class suit, because of
the absent member's attenuated relationship to the litigation, they may
not know whether a compromise favors greater attorneys' fees and lesser
benefits for them. Professor Wolfram has noted that "most [class action]
lawyers regard themselves as entrepreneurs and largely act accord-
ingly"; 62 their self-interest can be restrained only by client control.63 If
he is correct, then nothing in the class setting prevents attorneys from
58. See eg., Waid, Ethical Problems of the Class Action Practitioner: Continued Neglect by the
Drafters of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 LoY. L. REv. 1047, 1061-74 (1981)
(discussing postfiling conflicts of interest involving class certification, settlements, and fee recovery);
Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1244,
1447-57 (1981) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (stating that the class lawyer's duty to his
client is ambiguous because the class is composed of so many disparate elements).
59. See, eg., Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action (pt. 2), 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067,
1115-16 (1980); Developments in the Law, supra note 58, at 1536-37.
60. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396
U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970). In common fund cases, the attorney's and clients' interests may differ on
whether to accept a small settlement offer that will contain enough to cover the fee award. See
Coffee, Rethinking, supra note 22, at 647-48; Coffee, supra note 11, at 718.
61. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-33 (1986). Simultaneous negotiation of class awards
and attorneys' fees presents two possible conflicts. See Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Law-
yers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984,
at 293, 294-307. First, the attorney may be forced to waive fees to obtain an extremely favorable
settlement for the class. The Supreme Court has ruled that the approval of such settlements is
within the discretion of the district courts and they do not violate the policies of 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982), which authorizes fee awards to attorneys in civil rights actions. 475 U.S. at 737-38. The
attorney faced with the proposal is under an ethical obligation to act in favor of the client. Id. at
727-28. If lawyers ignore their ethical obligation and reject the proposal, presumably opposing coun-
sel could seek independent approval of the proposal under rule 23(e), or seek to have the attorney
dismissed as an inadequate representative for failing to act vigorously in the best interests of the
class. If the attorney acts ethically and accepts a monetary settlement waiving rights to seek fees
from the opponent, the problem is similar to the common fund cases because the lump sum awarded
the class represents the only possible source of fees.
The second conflict that arises out of simultaneous negotiation is when the settlement caters to
the attorneys' self-interest by a particularly generous fee allowance that lessens class relief. See
Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972).
62. Wolfram, supra note 61, at 295.
63. See id. at 295-96.
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following their "natural inclinations," compromising the absent mem-
bers' interests in order to receive larger fees.64
In the second scenario, the settlement proposal may offer varying
benefits to the class members and class representatives, favoring the few
members who are supervising the litigation.65 This situation creates a
conflict among the class members themselves. Can the attorney who rep-
resents the whole class support an agreement that favors the named rep-
resentatives, his "real clients," over the absent class members? Who does
the attorney ultimately represent?
Third, in institutional litigation, class attorneys often urge approval
of a settlement that favors prospective relief and major changes in institu-
tional policy over relief for past practices that harmed the named and
some of the unnamed class members. Class attorneys often pursue an
institutional action to foster certain public improvements rather than the
interests of any particular client.66 In this context, lawyers may have
developed their own perception of their clients67 that conflicts with the
actual class the attorney represents. 68 Each of these scenarios highlights
the conflicts that necessarily arise when a lawyer represents clients with
potentially divergent interests or when the lawyer's interests diverge from
those of the client.
64. I am not criticizing class action lawyers for being entrepreneurs. Rather, this fact simply
clarifies why their interest may diverge from the class during settlement.
For the class members the suit may resemble a giant lottery that could yield a modest
payoff. For the attorney, it is serious business. Having located a class representative,
fronted the cost of litigation, and invested years of time, the lawyer is likely to be reluctant
to risk all on a trial.
R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPL]EX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED
CIVIL PROCEDURE 243 (1985).
65. See infra note 78; see also Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 672 (D. Ariz.
1978) (dismissing class allegations because named plaintiffs and counsel were not pursuing interests
of the entire class); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating that named
plaintiff moved to dismiss class action 3o that an individual settlement offer could be accepted and
completed).
66. See, e.g., Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (1982)
(noting that class actions focus on insttutional practices rather than individual grievances).
67. The traditional view recognizes that lawyers and clients have different perceptions of a case.
Attorneys hold a "judicial" perspective of the case tied to the attorneys' sense of right and wrong.
See Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction vith the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV.
729, 773 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 276-77 (1964).
68. See Chambers, Class Action Litigation: Representing Divergent Interests of Class Members,
4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 353, 357 (1979); Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and
the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. RE'. 728, 745-48 (1986); Rhode, supra note 66, at 1210-12. The
problem for lawyers in institutional reform litigation may be even more basic: attorneys must decide
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B. Traditional Solutions
Once we have identified the problems created by the lawyer's special
role in class litigation, the question becomes: What procedural safe-
guards exist or can be developed to avoid, or at least reduce, the possibil-
ity of harm flowing from these conflicts? 69 Rule 23(e) protects class
members from some potential attorney conflicts of interest in settlements
by mandating judicial approval and notice of any proposed settlement.70
For example, if a settlement unfairly favors the attorneys or the named
representatives, judicial approval may be withheld and the class attor-
neys disqualified from continuing to represent the entire class. 71 The re-
quired notice to absent class members of any settlement proposal, with
the opportunity to object,72 also should restrain attorneys from attempt-
ing to ignore any group within the class.
Although few courts have disapproved class settlements as a result
of inadequate representation, 73 this alone does not establish that rule
23(e) is providing inadequate protection to the class. 74 The apparently
low incidence of first scenario cases (settlements awarding minimal class
relief and sizable attorneys' fees) may indicate that attorneys are well
aware of the courts' sensitivity to any settlement that favors the lawyers
over the class, and thus attorneys consciously avoid them. Neither oppo-
nents nor the class attorneys spend time developing such proposals be-
cause their chances of approval are slim.
69. In traditional litigation these conflicts could result in attorney disqualification. The unique
character of class actions and the lawyer's role in them, however, should allow for a different result.
See In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163-65 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concur-
ring). Indeed Professor Coffee has gone even further, suggesting that reliance on procedural devices
to cure class action problems of client control is misplaced and unlikely to have any real effect on
attorney conduct. He offers an alternative approach: "inducing attorneys to mimic the results that a
healthy, functioning market for legal services would produce." Coffee, Regulation, supra note 22, at
878.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). For a discussion of how that provision operates in practice, see 7B
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, §§ 1797-1797.1.
71. E.g., Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1145-46 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2889 (1986); Franks v. Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981); Soskel v. Texaco, Inc., 94
F.R.D. 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Courts have recognized that they must provide objectors with a full
opportunity to expose the problems of a particular settlement proposal. For example, courts have
allowed discovery of how the attorneys conducted negotiations. See, e.g., In re General Motors
Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1123-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870
(1979).
73. See, eg., cases cited supra note 71; cases cited infra note 78.
74. Professor Wolfram has suggested that court approval of settlements over the objection of
the named class representative illustrates the lack of both client control and deference to client
desires. Wolfram, supra note 61, at 298. Although I am sympathetic to Professor Wolfram's notion
that class representatives exercise little effective control over the class attorneys, he fails to recognize
that the representative is only one of the "clients," and the problem more often may be a divergence
of interests among class members. These undetected conflicts may emerge only at settlement time.
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Even if the courts easily can identify problem settlement proposals
that explicitly provide for large attorneys' fees, the solution is not always
self-evident. Courts then must resolve the divergent interests of the class
attorney, who desires to maximize fees, and the class members, who pre-
fer to maximize their awards.75 In the vast majority of class actions, fees
are deducted from the class recovery because: (1) no statute authorizes
fee shifting to the opponent (requiring that the award be based on the
common fund rationale), or (2) the attorney has agreed in the settlement
not to seek fees from the opponent (narrowing the recourse for compen-
sation to the settlement award).76 In either case, the court must protect
the class members when their attorney seeks fees that will reduce their
recovery. At that point, class counsel's interests are competing with
those of her clients in the allocation of a finite sum. Further, the court
cannot rely on opposing counsel to assure a full adversary presentation of
the attorneys' fees application because, having reached a settlement, the
class opponents have no interest in how the fee issue is resolved.77 Thus,
attention to the special nature of class counsel's role at this stage exposes
a need for increased judicial scrutiny.
Cases that fall into the second or third scenarios pose additional
difficulties because the court may not discover that a conflict exists.
Consider the typical case: the judge is given a proposal that clearly bene-
fits some class members at the expense of others,78 attorneys from all
sides ardently support the proposal,79 and despite notice, 0 few if any
75. See Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During
Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REv. 308, 316 (1985).
76. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
77. The only possible adversaries -.o the attorneys' fee petition may be those that object to the
settlement proposal itself. E.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 125 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975). The presence of objectors, however, is not sufficient protec-
tion, particularly when individual class members do not have large amounts at stake. But cf. Shlen-
sky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 150 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that conflict between class and class counsel
over attorneys' fees is minimized in a shareholder derivative suit because the corporation retains an
interest in decreasing the amount of fers).
78. Courts have disapproved settlements that facially reveal an unfair allocation to the named
representatives. E.g., Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1148 (1lth Cir. 1983); Franks
v. Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1981).
79. When determining whether a particular settlement proposal is fair, a court may consider
whether it has the support of all the attorneys in the case. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1215-16 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Milstein v. Huck,
600 F. Supp. 254, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). But see In re Art Mat'ls Antitrust Litig., 100 F.R.D. 367,
371 (N.D. Ohio 1983) ("However much this court respects the professional judgment of the highly
experienced counsel involved in this litigation,... the proposed settlement must be independently
evaluated within the confines of the case at bar-such is the nature of the judicial function.").
80. Although courts often state that because notice was sent they may treat the failure to object
as approval, the failure to respond also may reflect the inability to understand what is involved. See
Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 321-22 (1973); Rhode, supra note
66, at 1234-36. On the other hand, if the class is relatively sophisticated or if large amounts are at
stake for each member, then reliance on the notice and lack of opposition may be entirely reasonable.
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absent class members object. 81 What procedures can ensure that the
judge can recognize whether some class members' interests have been
overlooked? Class action lawyers should have incentives to disclose fully
all relevant information. Additionally, the lawyers must be cognizant of
the conflicts among class members, especially in institutional litigation.
Although the procedural protections of notice and judicial approval
of all settlements in class litigation have existed since the original Federal
Rules, 82 serious charges of conflicts of interest persist. Thus, the ques-
tion remains whether these safeguards are enough, and if not, what other
measures are available.
The courts have not been blind to any of these problems, but their
responses have not always been creative. Some judges simply assume
that, although the problems are real, the existing requirement of judicial
scrutiny of settlement proposals, including attorneys' fees, will protect
class members adequately.8 3 Other judges have accepted the duty of
heightened scrutiny of attorneys' fee petitions. 84 Some courts have con-
cluded that class members are protected adequately if the parties negoti-
ate the attorney fee award after the settlement on the merits, thereby
reducing the potential for a conflict of interest.85 In two cases, the court
appointed a guardian to represent the class and evaluate the benefits of a
See, eg., Art Mat'ls, 100 F.R.D. at 372; In re Armored Car Antitrust Litig., 472 F. Supp. 1357,
1378-79 (N.D. Ga. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 645 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. Unit B
May 1981).
81. See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1, 11 (N.D. Ohio
1982) (stating that no objections were filed and only .27% of class requested exclusion); Bennett v.
Behring Corp., 96 F.R.D. 343, 353 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (stating that less than 10% of class objected).
82. The original rule 23(c) stated the requirements of judicial approval and notice of all dismis-
sals and compromises. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c), 308 U.S. 690 (1938). The 1966 amendments to rule
23(e) absorbed these requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), 383 U.S. 1050 (1966 amend.).
83. E.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1214 (5th Cir. Unit A), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828
(1982); Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981).
84. E.g., Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 661 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Fickinger
v. C.I. Planning Corp., 646 F. Supp. 622, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. Sec.
Litig., 643 F. Supp. 148, 152 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Rothfarb v. Hambrecht, 641 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
85. Negotiating a settlement on the merits before discussing attorneys' fees obviously would
prevent the potential conflicting interests that could encourage the attorney to represent the class
less vigorously. Consequently, several courts have banned simultaneous negotiations of the merits
and attorneys' fees. E.g., Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); Lisa F.
v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724, 726 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670,
671-72 (D. Ariz. 1978); Lyon v. State, 80 F.R.D. 665, 669 (D. Ariz. 1978). But see Moore v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 762 F.2d 1093, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that courts in title VII
class actions should not prohibit simultaneous negotiation of merits and fees); Lazar v. Pierce, 757
F.2d 435, 438-39 (Ist Cir. 1985) (suggesting that, to encourage defense of indigents, counsel should
be able to insist on a reasonable fee at the time of settlement on the merits, even if detrimental to
successful settlement). Other courts have disapproved the simultaneous negotiation practice,
although recognizing that it might be used under limited circumstances. E.g., Obin v. District No. 9
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settlement apart from the proposed fees.86 Although all these solutions
may protect class members from truly egregious results, they do not
identify or control more subtle biases that can be present. Additionally,
these approaches only create an incentive for attorneys to get a settle-
ment that merely is sufficient to avoid judicial disapproval, rather than
the "best settlement" possible for the class.
Courts have begun to recognize the need for additional controls, es-
pecially the need to develop the means to discover and even prevent some
of these conflicts of interest.87 One preventative technique focuses on the
adequate representation requirement for class certification. 88 Courts
commonly test the adequacy of class representation by examining the
abilities of the named class representatives and the class attorneys, re-
spectively. 89 Courts will certify a class only if the named party displays
an understanding of the casesO and an ability to fund the litigation.91 The
class attorney must demonstrate the necessary skill to assure "adequate
representation. ' 92 Those courts that have focused on the qualities of the
of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 582-84 (8th Cir. 1981); Mendoza v. United States, 623
F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
The Supreme Court's approval of the simultaneous negotiation approach in Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717, 738 n.30 (1986), greatly discourages courts from using absolute bans to avoid potential
conflicts. Although the Court's ruling was confined to the problem of fee waivers in cases under 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), which allows attorneys' fees, and thus did not decide the question discussed in
the text, the opinion suggests that the Court would not be receptive to arguments that a ban was
necessary in common fund cases. The Court specifically noted that no conflict of interest is posed by
simultaneous negotiation because, under the governing professional codes, the attorney has but one
ethical duty: to act in the best interest of his client. 475 U.S. at 727-28 & n.14. Furthermore, the
Court noted its concern that a rule prohibiting comprehensive negotiation of the case could preclude
settlements because of the defendants' need to know the total cost of the predicted judgment. Id. at
733-34.
86. See Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l B1ank, 77 F.R.D. 382, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Miller v. Mackey
Int'l, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533, 535 (S.D. Fa. 1976).
87. Some commentators have suggested ways in which courts can be better informed of poten-
tial conflicts prior to certification. See. e.g., Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Sug-
gested Perspective, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 492, 515-21 (1982) (stating that a court should impose a
formal duty on counsel to apprise it of all dissenting views); Comment, Conflicts in Class Actions and
Protection of Absent Class Members, 91 YALE L.J. 590, 592-98 (1982) (stating that a court should
encourage class attorneys to communicate with absentees and solicit information to define the class).
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
89. See 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1766, at 294-303, § 1769.1, at
374-75.
90. Compare In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 140-41 (D.N.J. 1984) (noting
that named plaintiffs were sufficiently knowledgeable) with Efros v. Nationwide Corp., 98 F.R.D.
703, 708 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that plaintiff displayed a "glaring" lack of familiarity with the
case).
91. See, e.g., Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1112 (5th Cir. 1978), affd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 535 (W.D. La.
1976); see also 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1767 (stating that the
financial stake of the representatives may be an important factor in the adequacy of representation).
92. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Jackscn, 102 F.R.D. 839, 844-45 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Munoz v. Ari-
zona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 672 iD. Ariz. 1978); see also 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
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named representatives try to ensure that the named representative is in-
dependent and can supervise the attorney's decisions. Courts have re-
fused to certify class actions in which the named representative was a
member of the class lawyer's firm or family,93 or when the class attorney
was representing the class pro se.94
A second protective device that stems from rule 23(a)'s requirement
of adequate representation is the use of subclasses. Presuming that more
participants will reduce the potential that conflicts of interest will be
unexposed or that some interests will be unrepresented, many judges but-
tress representation at the outset of litigation by appointing multiple rep-
resentatives95 and establishing subclasses, each with their own counsel.96
Adding more attorneys, however, may exacerbate the existing problems
of management and coordination 97 and also may deplete the class recov-
ery with additional attorney fee awards. Thus, that cure may be worse
than the disease.
Although courts should ensure that attorneys are not manufacturing
litigation by finding "straw" clients or by improperly financing the litiga-
tion,98 the focus on ensuring an independent representative for each in-
terest really does not address the more pervasive problem of class
management. Instead, this approach attempts to force class actions into
KANE, supra note 4, § 1769.1 (stating that prior to certification courts must consider an attorney's
quality of work and experience, as well as willingness and ability to prosecute the action vigorously).
93. E.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, 578 F.2d 102, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1978); Kramer v. Scientific
Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1093 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Lyon v. State, 80
F.R.D. 665, 668-69 (D. Ariz. 1978); see also Note, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Representation
Vis-d-vis Class Representative and Class Counsel, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 141, 150 (1986) (stating that
close association between named representative and attorney could create conflicts of interest result-
ing in a settlement unfavorable to class members).
94. E.g., Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975); Huddleston v. Duck-
worth, 97 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Ind. 1983); see also Note, supra note 93, at 146-50 (noting potential
for conflict of interest because attorney fees are generally greater than the share awarded to class
representative).
95. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. United States Dist. Court, 457 F.2d 1399, 1400 (5th Cir. 1972);
Sommers v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581, 589 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
96. E.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 435 (N.D. Tex. 1979); I.M.A.G.E.
v. Bailar, 78 F.R.D. 549, 557 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F. Supp.
765, 774 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.
1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 672 (1977); see also Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 135 (1977) (remand-
ing and suggesting that the district court recognize the different interests of the class with separate
representation). But see Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100, 1123-24 (N.D. Ga.
1975) (refusing to certify class because, among other reasons, interests of class and subclass were
antagonistic and separate counsel would not cure antagonism).
97. See supra Part II.
98. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 to -104 (1980). To pre-
vent improper solicitation and financing, some courts allow discovery of the fee arrangements be-
tween the named representative and the class attorney. E.g., Klein v. Henry S. Miller Residential
Servs., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 6, 8-9 (N.D. Tex. 1978). But see Stahler v. Jamesway Corp., 85 F.R.D. 85, 86
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (denying discovery because neither computation of attorneys' fees nor the fee ar-
rangement between attorney and representative was relevant to issue of adequacy of representation).
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a classical model in which lawyers are hired by clients with traditional
objectives who must be consulted about decisions that affect the available
relief. In this model, clients can guard against attorney self-interest and
conflicts of interest, and the attorney can single-mindedly pursue the
goals of the client. Even with the highest of motives, intelligence, and
funding, however, the named class representatives may not be able to
assure that all class members are adequately represented. 99 The class
members' goals may be quite diverse, especially at the settlement stage,
and the very complexity of the litigation and its proposed resolution may
be something that only the lawyers and judges can comprehend fully. 10°
Assuming that the special dilemmas for class counsel can be resolved by
relying on a greater number of more independent class representatives is
simply sticking one's head in the sand.
C. Proposed Solutions: Inc.reased Judicial Scrutiny and Attorney
Cooperation
Once one acknowledges these complexities, as well as the inappro-
priateness of relying on the named representatives to resolve these dilem-
mas, the question becomes: What can judges do, and what should be
class counsel's role? Initially, the courts should and will continue to en-
sure that class counsel is competent before certifying a class action. This
inquiry is critical because of' the attorney's increased responsibilities in
class actions. 01 Class counsel has the opportunity to confer good on
many, but he also can spread harm just as widely. Class attorneys must
recognize these special problems as well as demonstrate their special
competence in this complex form of litigation.10 2
Judges also can play an important role in combating conflicts of in-
99. The court still must examine the named representatives because the adequate representation
inquiry is supposed to serve two functions. The first is to determine whether there is a "live" client,
to satisfy article III's case or controversy requirement. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494-95
(1974). The second function is the investigation of the qualities of the named class representative.
This inquiry is undertaken ostensibly to improve the possibility that the representatives can control
the lawyers. See Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/Am. Express, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1057 (N.D.
Ga. 1986). In most cases, this latter kind of inquiry fails to ensure that objective and thus is a waste
of scarce judicial resources.
100. This statement does not suggest that clients never are capable of monitoring and actively
participating in litigation. Rather, it simply recognizes the unique character of class action proceed-
ings, which, as described by Professor Coffee, present an unstable coalition of persons with different
and conflicting interests and in which critical decisions have "lower visibility and require greater
expertise to understand." Coffee, Rethinking, supra note 22, at 629.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
102. Professor Rhode asserts that inquiry into counsel's competence is rarely meaningful, be-
cause she believes that few judges will engage "in public ad hominems." Rhode, supra note 66, at
1193-94. This conclusion gives too little- weight to the growing judicial awareness of the need for this
inquiry and the many existing examples of careful scrutiny. See 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, supra note 4, § 1769.1. Although relying exclusively on this review would be imprudent, one
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terest. The remedy lies in judicial supervision and continuing scrutiny of
potential conflicts of interest that might cloud counsel's judgment.10 3 As
already noted, rule 23(e) provides that class action settlements are per-
mitted only after notice and judicial approval. 10 4 The court, as acknowl-
edged protector of absent class members, 0 5 must review carefully any
proposed settlement to ensure that it is a fair resolution of the contro-
versy.10 6 If the class attorney does not balance all the interests equitably,
or if he favors one group or himself at the expense of another, the court
may deny approval.'0 7 Judicial oversight of settlement agreements is an
important mechanism to avoid conflicts of interest and injury to some
class members' interests; alone, however, it is insufficient. Theoretically,
the judicial approval requirement encourages lawyers to think and pre-
pare carefully before any settlement decisions are reached because coun-
sel knows that the court will scrutinize any agreement with care. In
practice, however, the rule protects the parties only against the most
egregious and blatant abuses. 108
The problem thus is how to make judicial supervision more effec-
tive'0 9 and pervasive. The notion that the court must protect the inter-
ests of the absent class members should be constant throughout the
litigation, not just for settlements. To be more effective, the judge must
participate actively earlier and fully apprise himself of present and poten-
tial problems. Some courts have recognized this necessity and have held
that class counsel has an affirmative duty to reveal any conflicts of inter-
est that arise to the court." 0 Absent class members may appeal or collat-
must approach the problem of conflicting interests from many angles. Careful scrutiny of class
attorneys at the certification stage may avoid later problems in at least some cases.
103. One suggestion made in the derivative suit context that also might apply to class suits is
setting a percentage ceiling on the attorney's potential recovery. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 46, § 7.18 comment c. Under this proposal, attorneys will have no incentive to spend useless
hours running up their bills, see supra text accompanying notes 39-43, and their interests, therefore,
will be more closely aligned with the class, see supra notes 60-61. Although this proposal does not
solve the problem completely, it certainly is the kind of creative technique that courts should
consider.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1797, at
340. See generally id. § 1797.1 (discussing the factors courts consider in approving class action
settlements).
105. See infra note 120.
106. 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1797.1.
107. See, eg., cases cited supra notes 71 and 78.
108. See, eg., cases cited supra notes 71 and 78; cf. Note, supra note 75, at 319-25 (suggesting
that rule 23 may not protect the parties from even blatant abuses).
109. One commentator has suggested that courts can improve the effectiveness of judicial scru-
tiny by appointing a neutral third-party guardian to oversee the pretrial negotiation process. Note,
supra note 75, at 308.
110. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs, v. Mathews, 551 F.2d
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erally attack any judgment if class counsel fails to do so."I But this
threat is meaningful only if one can assume that an interested absentee
will come forward to expose the problem-an unlikely possibility if past
experience is any guide. Indeed, the bar is likely to view any attempt to
impose a duty of disclosure, with the threat of sanctions for failing to do
so, as a nuisance, and thus this approach is not likely to encourage class
counsel to be more alert to conflicts of interest.11 2
Professor Rhode, who has examined thoroughly the problems of
conflicts of interest in institutional litigation," 3 proposes a scheme of
mandatory disclosure to expose any potential conflicts between the class
and the attorney or among the class members themselves. 114 She sets out
three primary strategies to effectuate this objective. First, to ensure the
court's sensitivity to the importance of notice to the class,"15 the court
should construct an elaborate factual record about the information pro-
vided to the class. 116 Second, the court should make a complete factual
record about the adequacy of representation before any decree is entered.
To accomplish this, courts should require counsel to disclose all contacts
with class members and any substantial class dissension."17 Third, she
would prohibit simultaneous negotiation of fees with the merits." 18 This
elaborate system, however, would be extremely costly and burdensome to
courts and counsel and is uralikely to produce the needed control. The
system's very formality easily could devolve into pro forma compliance.
Nonetheless, the thesis underlying Professor Rhode's suggestions is
sound. The court must have better information before it can oversee the
class action effectively. The problem lies in achieving that objective." 9
340, 346 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977); League of Martin v. City of
Milwaukee, 588 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
111. Unnamed class members in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), successfully attacked a
prior judgment on conflict of interest grounds. See also 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
supra note 4, § 1789, at 247 (noting that absent class members can attack a judgment on grounds of
inadequate representation).
112. To avoid this problem, Professor Rhode suggests that courts should make clear to all par-
ties that exposing conflicts will not guarantee decertification, and that courts should increase attor-
neys' fees for that work. Rhode, supra note 66, at 1250. This last incentive certainly also would
apply to my less structured suggestion of cooperation between the court and class action attorneys.
See infra text accompanying notes 120-36.
113. See Rhode, supra note 66, at 1186-91. Professor Rhode focuses primarily on rule 23(b)(2)
suits in which the conflict arose at the remedial stage. Id.
114. Id. at 1197-1202.
115. Notice is not typically required in institutional class suits because they are brought under
rule 23(b)(2). See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 257 (3d Cir. 1979); 7B C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1786.
116. Rhode, supra note 66, at 1248.
117. Id. at 1249-50.
118. Id. at 1251. The likelihood of courts adopting a ban on simultaneous negotiations is slim.
See supra note 85.
119.' One commentator has suggested that the courts fashion special attorney-client privilege
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The most productive way to monitor class actions carefully may not
require formal procedures, but rather less formal cooperation between
the courts and the lawyers. Unlike most other litigation in which attor-
neys appropriately may view the court as the final, somewhat removed
arbiter of the dispute, the judge in a class action necessarily must actively
and independently protect the rights of absent class members. 120 Conse-
quently, attorneys should seek the court's aid in resolving some of the
class action's representational problems. Class counsel should not hide
conflicts and problems in making decisions affecting people with differ-
ent views, but instead should disclose fully any conflicts, using the court
as a resource to help resolve these problems. Only a partnership between
the judge and class counsel can ensure adequate representation.
This kind of partnership and cooperation would require a major
change in attitude by both the bench and bar. Reflecting on the role of
judges and lawyers in the American court system over thirty years ago,
one commentator succinctly summarized this attitudinal problem:
Unfortunately, true understanding of the judicial process is not
shared by all lawyers or judges. Instead of regarding themselves as
occupying a reciprocal relationship in a common purpose, they are
apt to think of themselves as representing opposite poles and exer-
cising divergent functions. The lawyer is active, the judge passive.
The lawyer partisan, the judge neutral. The lawyer imaginative,
the judge reflective. 121
This observation remains valid today. One legitimately can question
whether significant change in these traditional postures ever will oc-
cur.122 A break from this long tradition will require both judges and
lawyers to perceive some gains to be achieved by change.
Furthermore, the viability of inducing cooperation may vary de-
rules to allow class members full inquiry into the communications of counsel and the named repre-
sentatives. Class members then could disclose any problems to the court. See Note, The Attorney-
Client Privilege in Class Actions: Fashioning an Exception To Promote Adequacy of Representation,
97 HARV. L. REv. 947, 956-60 (1984). This proposal would reduce the possibility of conflicts in my
second scenario, see supra text accompanying note 66, although its success depends on unnamed
class members assuming that oversight function.
120. Courts widely recognize their special position as guardian of all class members' rights. See,
ag., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983);
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1217 (1983); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 864 (1975).
121. D. PECK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT AND COUNSEL 7 (1954).
122. Any abandonment of tradition is likely to create serious consternation, at least until there is
time to absorb its effects. For example, the court abandoned traditional roles in In re "Agent Or-
ange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), in
which Judge Weinstein became an active participant in shaping the settlement. Although many
participants praised the results, many also feared the potential problems of judicial overreaching.
See Schuck, supra note 20, at 359-61 (noting that judicial overreaching may cause lawyers to con-
form their actions to desires of judge, not needs of clients).
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pending on the type of litigation involved. In particular, judges may be
more willing to oversee institutional class litigation (represented in my
third scenario) 123 than damage class suits. Some of the unique features of
institutional class litigation-problems of prospective relief and in-
dependent counsel persona, as well as the recognition of these suits' im-
portant prophylactic effect--may encourage judges to supervise the
litigation actively. Although damage actions also are legitimate private
enforcement devices, the class members' interests often are more highly
individualized and obvious. Additionally, class members in these actions
have the opportunity to opt-out of the class. 1 24 Also, the class attorney's
motivation for bringing the suit is more likely to be economic than ideo-
logical. Consequently, the courts often will be concerned in damage suits
with the more obvious conflicts that may arise between the attorney and
the class,125 not with the potential for more subtle conflicts among class
members. Indeed, the damage class action has been the most highly crit-
icized form of class relief, perhaps reflecting a belief that it does not serve
as important a role as institutional class litigation.1 26 Because of these
distinctions, judges in damage suits may not be as willing to assume addi-
tional supervisory responsibilities. Instead, they simply may refuse to
certify actions with potential conflicts or they may be content to rely on
class members to opt-out of the suits. Finally, courts still review settle-
ment proposals in those actions and thus do perform some oversight. 127
Even if we disregard the differences between institutional and dam-
age class actions, the basic question remains: What incentives might en-
courage judges and attorney,; to shed their typical postures and enter into
a more cooperative partnership as a way of avoiding or reducing the dan-
gers of distorted results caused by conflicting interests in class actions?
Judges have been schooled to remain independent and aloof, and they are
extremely busy, indeed, overworked. Thus, it may be unrealistic to ex-
pect the courts to welcome yet another responsibility to their already
overcrowded schedules. Class litigation, however, always has made great
demands on judicial resources,1 28 and this suggestion ultimately may save
time because ongoing informal consultations may avert later less mean-
ingful and time-consuming formal reviews and proceedings.129 As judges
123. See supra text accompanying note 66.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
125. See supra text accompanying note 11.
126. See Miller, supra note 15, at 675-76; see also Marcus, Apocalypse Now? (Book Review), 85
MICH. L. REV. 1267, 1284-89 (1987) (describing some of the problems in the Agent Orange litigation
surrounding class counsel).
127. See 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 4, § 1797.
128. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
129. The virtue and need of early consultation with the court was underscored in Agent Orange.
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slowly accept the need to develop case management techniques, 130 they
also may be persuaded to assume a consultative role in order to avoid
potential conflicts of interest.1 31  This is particularly true because the
judge is not required actively to seek out conflicts; 132 rather he merely
must encourage the class attorneys to seek advice.
Opponents of class certification might view the court's more active
role as harmful because of the risk that the judge will lose his indepen-
dence. Even if that is not so, if the public perceives that the court has
become a participant, rather than an independent arbiter, that itself may
undermine the integrity of the process. Some defendants in In re "'Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation 1 3 3 raised this question when Judge
Weinstein became so intimately involved in the settlement stage that he
essentially crafted the proposal and then was charged with determining
whether it was fair and reasonable.1 34  Although Agent Orange may be
unique and not really apposite because Judge Weinstein's role was more
active than my proposal contemplates, the concern is a legitimate one.
See infra text accompanying notes 133-34. In order to obtain sufficient capital to fund the litigation,
the nine lawyers comprising the plaintiffs' management committee entered into a private fee-sharing
arrangement, providing for a threefold return on advances before the remaining fee monies would be
distributed under the lodestar formula. They did not reveal the arrangement to the court until after
the settlement was approved and petitions for fees were filed. Judge Weinstein reluctantly upheld
the plan, finding no conflict of interest in fact had occurred. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The Second Circuit reversed. In re "Agent Or-
ange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Appeal of Dean), 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987). The court specifically noted
that court review of the settlement under rule 23(e) was not sufficient to limit the threat from a
potential conflict of interest. Id. at 224. Rather, counsel must inform the judge of any fee-sharing
arrangements when they are formulated. "Only by reviewing the agreement prospectively will the
district courts be able to prevent potential conflicts from arising ...." Id. at 226.
130. The focus on pretrial management is reflected in the total revision of rule 16 in 1983 provid-
ing specific authority for early judicial control of case scheduling, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 97 F.R.D.
168 (1983 amend.), as well as the amendments to rule 26 in 1980 and 1983 providing additional tools
for judicial management of discovery to eliminate waste, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 97 F.R.D. 171 (1983
amend.); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 85 F.R.D. 526 (1980 amend.).
131. The judge should not delegate this responsibility to a master or magistrate because it is not
a question of ruling on issues that may be sent to another independent professional and then re-
viewed by the court. What is involved is the court's own guardianship responsibilities on behalf of
the class. Furthermore, the contact made and information gained through such consultations will be
most valuable when a party presents some proposed settlement to the court.
132. Cf. Rhode, supra note 66, at 1218-21 (discussing institutional constraints that tend to leave
judges in a passive role regarding their responsibilities under rule 23). One noted jurist argues that
the trial judge who acts as a participant is more likely to impair the trial process than aid it. Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1045 (1975). He views the
court, however, as an active intruder, whereas the model discussed here presents a responsive role.
Judge Frankel then suggests that it might be productive to consider modifying the adversary model
in some cases to provide better information, such as in an inquisitorial model. Id. at 1053.
133. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation began in 1979. Judge Weinstein ap-
proved the settlement. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 862 (E.D.N.Y.
1984). The Second Circuit upheld his decision. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d
145, 174 (2d Cir. 1987).
134. Schuck, supra note 122, at 362. Others have voiced this criticism. See, e.g., Marcus, supra
note 126, at 1295 (raising questions about Judge Weinstein's role).
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Nonetheless, the judge's responsibilities always have been one-sided at
the settlement stage of class actions: the court's uniformly recognized
role is to review any proposals to preserve the rights of the class mem-
bers, not to make certain that the class opponents have not given away
too much. Judicial protection, however, should be used as a resource
throughout the litigation, rather than solely as a check on the end result.
If there is concern in a particular case that a given judge went too far,
abandoning all impartiality, appellate courts always are available to scru-
tinize the results. 135
The potential success of this counseling or partnership model, how-
ever, depends primarily on its acceptance by class counsel and their will-
ingness to use the court in this fashion. Most class action lawyers view
the judges' role as threatening rather than helpful in achieving a desired
solution; consequently, they contact the courts only as the last resort.
This view may have developed in part because in some cases judges have
forced cooperation and because many lawyers simply do not believe that
the conflicts described earlier even exist, much less that they need outside
help to resolve them. Whatever the reason, as judges increase their case
management and more careftully scrutinize settlement proposals, the bar
must realize that a partnership with the court can be only beneficial.1 36
Attorneys willing to try this approach may find more tangible incen-
tives.137 Not only will lawyers avoid wasted efforts (e.g., rejected settle-
ment proposals), but courts that are fully apprised of all problems and
working with the attorneys may be less likely to appoint additional coun-
sel to ensure full representation, thereby increasing the fee potential.
More importantly, the capacity to handle these problems better ensures
the adequacy of the represeatation, decreasing the opponent's ability to
135. Typically, appellate review of judgments entered as a result of a settlement differs from
review of other judgments because it is limited to ensuring that the appropriate procedural safe-
guards were utilized and that the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining fairness. See
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1214 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1115 (1979); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 864 (1975).
136. Class action lawyers may have to view the obligation to discover and reveal potential con-
flicts to the court as part of their ethical duties. Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1318, 1392-97 (1976) [hereinafter Class Actions].
137. Professor Rhode concludes that the class lawyer's responsibility to apprise trial judges of
conflicting interests has proved unworkable in practice and suggests that, at least in institutional
litigation, counsel has prudential and ideological reasons not to expose the divergent class interest.
Rhode, supra note 66, at 1205-12. Her analysis of the disincentives for disclosure in institutional
litigation also would suggest that these same attorneys never will change their attitudes and ap-
proach the court as a partner in dealing with intraclass conflicts. Id. at 1205-10. Although I agree
that not all will, some incentives exist to disclose conflicts that have not been appreciated fully.
Additionally, the courts' heightened sensitivity and increased scrutiny of the adequacy of the repre-
sentation prerequisite during the class certification and settlement review stages may have created a
climate in which attorneys will be more receptive to change.
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have the class decertified for that reason.13 8 Finally, the courts can en-
courage these partnerships by making clear that they favor such efforts
when they award attorneys' fees. Not only might the attorney be com-
pensated for the time spent in court consultations, but the fee might be
increased if the court concludes that the attorney's efforts produced sig-
nificant improvements, gained efficiencies, or avoided problems. 139
IV. Conclusion
The role of the class action lawyer presents some unique problems
for the litigating bar. Not only are new skills demanded, but special re-
sponsibilities must be assumed. No one suggestion or procedural change
can eliminate the complex management problems of or the potential for
conflicts in this modern form of litigation. The first step, however, is to
approach these problems anew, focusing on the lawyers and the need to
create incentives for them to modify their traditional attitudes and prac-
tices. Attorneys have recognized the need to develop better case manage-
ment techniques, and the courts are encouraging attorney cooperation
and creativity through their control of attorneys' fees. But the problem
of conflicts of interest in many class actions, although widely recognized,
is not as readily resolved. The solution must rest predominantly with
class counsel: Courts cannot achieve change unless the attorneys recog-
nize their special responsibilities and desire change. This Essay presents
just one small suggestion to aid that process of change with the hope that
it will inspire further reflection by class action participants, to the benefit
of all concerned.
138. See Class Actions, supra note 136, at 1493-98.
139. The Supreme Court has ruled in fee-shifting cases that an upward adjustment for quality
typically is not appropriate because the quality of the lawyering is reflected in the lawyer's rates.
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 899-900 (1984). When fees are premised on the common fund ra-
tionale, however, this restriction may be less compelling. Furthermore, the kind of cooperation
suggested here is the kind of exceptional or "superior" service that might merit an upward adjust-
ment even under the Supreme Court's standard-at least until such cooperation becomes the norm.
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